IT Governance in Actor-Network Mode of Collaboration : Cost Management Process Based on Game Theory

TL;DR

This paper explores how game theory, specifically the Shapley Value, can be used to build and visualize collaboration networks in IT governance, focusing on cost management and actor incentives.

Contribution

It introduces a formal approach using game theory within Actor-Network Theory to establish collaboration networks based on cost savings incentives in IT governance.

Findings

Identifies likely coalitions for cost savings in IT governance networks.

Develops a graphical tool for network visualization and simulation.

Highlights the role of incentives in actor-network collaboration.

Abstract

IT governance, like global governance of projects, requires cooperation between several actors. In general, such cooperation builds a collaboration network between entities. Many works in the literature interested in collaboration network, but no one of them were focused directly on how to build a network in an IT governance perspective. In this paper, we investigate how game theory can be exploited to provide a formal implementation of Cost Management Process, while highlighting Actor-Network as a framework of collaboration and its incentive stage as a key step for network construction. Our objective is to propose an approach of network establishment, by inciting actors through cost savings. For that, we use Shapley Value to answer the question: For the sake of IT governance, which coalitions are likely to form in order to ensure best cost-saving objectives in ANT mode of collaboration? A graphical tool is developed also to visualize and simulate networks evolution.