Comments On "A New Transient Attack On The Kish Key Distribution System"
Laszlo Bela Kish, Claes Goran Granqvist

TL;DR
This paper critiques a recent transient attack on the KLJN secure key system, clarifies misconceptions, and asserts that an improved version of KLJN remains secure against all known attacks.
Contribution
It provides a critical analysis of GAA's attack, corrects misconceptions about classical physics assumptions, and affirms the robustness of an upgraded KLJN system.
Findings
GAA's attack is valid but easily defendable.
Misstatements about classical physics in GAA's paper are corrected.
The improved KLJN system is immune to all known attacks.
Abstract
A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the KLJN system. Here we note that GAA's paper contains several invalid statements regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing attacks, including the one by GAA.
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