Interdependent Scheduling Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic model for interdependent scheduling where multiple players control services with dependencies, relevant to large-scale infrastructure coordination during crises.

Contribution

It formulates a novel interdependent scheduling game model and analyzes equilibrium existence, welfare maximization, and computational aspects of best responses and dynamics.

Findings

Nash equilibria may not always exist in the model.

Computing best responses is computationally challenging.

The model provides insights into coordination in critical infrastructure.

Abstract

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model, where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization, computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash equilibria.