Promotion of Cooperation by Selective Group Extinction

TL;DR

This paper introduces a model of selective group extinction that lowers the threshold for cooperation to emerge, suggesting previous models may have underestimated cooperation's stability.

Contribution

It presents a novel mechanism of group extinction based on group fitness, altering the understanding of multilevel selection in evolution.

Findings

Selective group extinction reduces the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for cooperation.

This mechanism enhances the likelihood of cooperation emerging and being maintained.

Previous models may have underestimated cooperation due to not considering group extinction effects.

Abstract

Multilevel selection is an important organizing principle that crucially underlies evolutionary processes from the emergence of cells to eusociality and the economics of nations. Previous studies on multilevel selection assumed that the effective higher-level selection emerges from lower-level reproduction. This leads to selection among groups, although only individuals reproduce. We introduce selective group extinction, where groups die with a probability inversely proportional to their group fitness. When accounting for this the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is substantially lowered. Because in game theory and evolutionary dynamics the degree of cooperation crucially depends on this ratio above which cooperation emerges previous studies may have substantially underestimated the establishment and maintenance of cooperation.