Modeling Evolutionary Dynamics of Lurking in Social Networks

TL;DR

This paper introduces the Lurker Game, a model based on evolutionary game theory to analyze and influence the transition between lurking and active participation in social networks, highlighting the impact of network topology and reward mechanisms.

Contribution

The paper presents the Lurker Game model, integrating network topology and reward strategies to understand and promote active user engagement in online communities.

Findings

Lurker Game effectively models lurking dynamics.

Reward mechanisms encourage active participation.

Network topology influences equilibrium states.

Abstract

Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by others in the community without actively contributing back to the production of social content. The amount and evolution of lurkers may strongly affect an online social environment, therefore understanding the lurking dynamics and identifying strategies to curb this trend are relevant problems. In this regard, we introduce the Lurker Game, i.e., a model for analyzing the transitions from a lurking to a non-lurking (i.e., active) user role, and vice versa, in terms of evolutionary game theory. We evaluate the proposed Lurker Game by arranging agents on complex networks and analyzing the system evolution, seeking relations between the network topology and the final equilibrium of the game. Results suggest that the Lurker Game is suitable to model the lurking dynamics, showing how the adoption of rewarding mechanisms combined with the modeling of hypothetical heterogeneity of users' interests may lead users in an online community towards a cooperative behavior.