Counterfactual Definiteness and Bell's Inequality
Karl Hess, Hans De Raedt, Kristel Michielsen

TL;DR
This paper argues that Bell's derivation of inequalities implicitly assumes counterfactual definiteness, which limits the generality of Bell-type theories and questions their comparison with real quantum experiments.
Contribution
It demonstrates that Bell's mathematical framework inherently includes counterfactual definiteness, constraining the scope of Bell-type theories.
Findings
Bell's functions and variables imply counterfactual definiteness.
This assumption reduces the generality of Bell-type theories.
No meaningful comparison with actual EPR experiments is possible under these assumptions.
Abstract
Counterfactual definiteness must be used as at least one of the postulates or axioms that are necessary to derive Bell-type inequalities. It is considered by many to be a postulate that is not only commensurate with classical physics (as for example Einstein's special relativity), but also separates and distinguishes classical physics from quantum mechanics. It is the purpose of this paper to show that Bell's choice of mathematical functions and independent variables implicitly includes counterfactual definiteness and reduces the generality of the physics of Bell-type theories so significantly that no meaningful comparison of these theories with actual Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments can be made.
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