A minimal model for the emergence of cooperation in randomly growing networks
Steve Miller, Joshua Knowles

TL;DR
This paper introduces a minimal, assumption-light model for the emergence of cooperation in growing networks, demonstrating that cooperation can arise without global knowledge or scale-free structures, relevant to early evolution.
Contribution
The model shows cooperation can emerge in randomly growing networks without preferential attachment or global information, broadening understanding of early evolutionary cooperation.
Findings
Cooperation emerges from non-cooperative populations.
The model does not require scale-free network structures.
Network growth by random addition supports cooperation.
Abstract
Cooperation is observed widely in nature and is thought an essential component of many evolutionary processes, yet the mechanisms by which it arises and persists are still unclear. Among several theories, network reciprocity -- a model of inhomogeneous social interactions -- has been proposed as an enabling mechanism to explain the emergence of cooperation. Existing evolutionary models of this mechanism have tended to focus on highly heterogeneous (scale-free) networks, hence typically assume preferential attachment mechanisms, and consequently the prerequisite that individuals have global network knowledge. Within an evolutionary game theoretic context, using the weak prisoner's dilemma as a metaphor for cooperation, we present a minimal model which describes network growth by chronological random addition of new nodes, combined with regular attrition of less fit members of the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Plant and animal studies
