Characterizing Solution Concepts in Terms of Common Knowledge of Rationality
Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses
TL;DR
This paper explores how various solution concepts in game theory, such as Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium, can be characterized through the lens of common knowledge of rationality, extending existing characterizations.
Contribution
It provides new characterizations of advanced equilibrium concepts like sequential and perfect equilibria using common knowledge of rationality, building on Halpern's 2009 results.
Findings
Characterizations of Nash, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge.
New characterizations of sequential, trembling hand perfect, and quasi-perfect equilibria.
Extension of Halpern's 2009 results to additional equilibrium concepts.
Abstract
Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium using results of Halpern [2009].
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems