Coalition Formability Semantics with Conflict-Eliminable Sets of Arguments
Ryuta Arisaka, Ken Satoh

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new semantics for coalition formation in abstract argumentation, using conflict-eliminability and numerical attack/argument strengths to better model coalition profitability and utility.
Contribution
It proposes four novel coalition formability semantics based on conflict-eliminability and quantitative attack/argument strengths, extending traditional conflict-free models.
Findings
Analysis of coalition profitability considering conflict-eliminability
Development of four new coalition formability semantics
Formalization of utility postulates in coalition formation
Abstract
We consider abstract-argumentation-theoretic coalition formability in this work. Taking a model from political alliance among political parties, we will contemplate profitability, and then formability, of a coalition. As is commonly understood, a group forms a coalition with another group for a greater good, the goodness measured against some criteria. As is also commonly understood, however, a coalition may deliver benefits to a group X at the sacrifice of something that X was able to do before coalition formation, which X may be no longer able to do under the coalition. Use of the typical conflict-free sets of arguments is not very fitting for accommodating this aspect of coalition, which prompts us to turn to a weaker notion, conflict-eliminability, as a property that a set of arguments should primarily satisfy. We require numerical quantification of attack strengths as well as of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMulti-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Semantic Web and Ontologies
