On Reductions from Multi-Domain Noninterference to the Two-Level Case
Oliver Woizekowski, Ron van der Meyden

TL;DR
This paper investigates how multi-domain noninterference security policies can be effectively reduced to two-domain cases, comparing different partitioning methods and highlighting the robustness of cut-based reductions.
Contribution
It introduces and analyzes cut-based partitionings for reducing multi-domain security policies to two-domain cases, showing their advantages over traditional Low-down and High-up methods.
Findings
Low-down reduction is weaker than cut-based and High-up reductions.
High-up reduction can be equivalent to cut-based reduction in some cases.
Cut-based partitioning offers a more robust approach for policy reduction.
Abstract
The literature on information flow security with respect to transitive policies has been concentrated largely on the case of policies with two security domains, High and Low, because of a presumption that more general policies can be reduced to this two-domain case. The details of the reduction have not been the subject of careful study, however. Many works in the literature use a reduction based on a quantification over "Low-down" partitionings of domains into those below and those not below a given domain in the information flow order. A few use "High-up" partitionings of domains into those above and those not above a given domain. Our paper argues that more general "cut" partitionings are also appropriate, and studies the relationships between the resulting multi-domain notions of security when the basic notion for the two-domain case to which we reduce is either Nondeducibility on…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Distributed systems and fault tolerance · Cryptography and Data Security
