Defining Concepts of Emotion: From Philosophy to Science
Changqing Liu

TL;DR
This paper explores the conceptual foundations of emotion, proposing formal definitions for emotion and related concepts like pleasure and beauty, and demonstrating how these definitions clarify understanding and resolve philosophical debates.
Contribution
It introduces a formal approach to defining emotions and related concepts, linking philosophical analysis with computational modeling.
Findings
Formal definitions of emotion and action tendency provided
Resolution of Einstein-Bohr dispute through linguistic analysis
Formal account of intensity of emotions and related concepts
Abstract
This paper is motivated by a series of (related) questions as to whether a computer can have pleasure and pain, what pleasure (and intensity of pleasure) is, and, ultimately, what concepts of emotion are. To determine what an emotion is, is a matter of conceptualization, namely, understanding and explicitly encoding the concept of emotion as people use it in everyday life. This is a notoriously difficult problem (Frijda, 1986, Fehr \& Russell, 1984). This paper firstly shows why this is a difficult problem by aligning it with the conceptualization of a few other so called semantic primitives such as "EXIST", "FORCE", "BIG" (plus "LIMIT"). The definitions of these thought-to-be-indefinable concepts, given in this paper, show what formal definitions of concepts look like and how concepts are constructed. As a by-product, owing to the explicit account of the meaning of "exist", the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEmotions and Moral Behavior · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Cognitive Science and Education Research
