On the Vulnerability of Digital Fingerprinting Systems to Finite Alphabet Collusion Attacks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new non-linear collusion attack on finite alphabet digital fingerprinting systems, demonstrating its effectiveness through theoretical analysis and simulations, and showing it requires fewer colluders to compromise the system.

Contribution

It presents a novel collusion attack method for finite alphabet fingerprinting systems, extending to continuous alphabets, with theoretical bounds and practical effectiveness demonstrated.

Findings

The attack reduces the number of colluders needed to break the system.

Simulation results show the attack outperforms theoretical predictions.

The method can be extended to continuous alphabet systems.

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel, non-linear collusion attack on digital fingerprinting systems. The attack is proposed for fingerprinting systems with finite alphabet but can be extended to continuous alphabet. We analyze the error probability of the attack for some classes of proposed random and deterministic schemes and obtain a bound on the number of colluders necessary to correctly estimate the host signal. That is, it requires fewer number of colluders to defeat the fingerprinting scheme. Our simulation results show that our attack is more powerful in practice than predicted by the theoretical bound.