Network Formation Game with Different Cost Value for Players

TL;DR

This paper investigates how varying link formation costs among players influence the structure, efficiency, and stability of social networks, extending previous models with uniform costs.

Contribution

It introduces a model analyzing network formation with heterogeneous link costs, exploring optimal and Nash equilibrium networks under these conditions.

Findings

Different cost values lead to diverse stable network structures.

Heterogeneous costs affect the efficiency of the resulting networks.

The study characterizes conditions for optimal and stable networks with varied costs.

Abstract

In Social Networks, it is often interesting to study type of networks formed, its efficiency with respect to social objective and which networks are stable. Many work have already been there in this area. Players in network formation game will incur some cost to form a link. In previous work, all player will have same cost for forming a link int he network. Here we will the study the optimal network and Nash equilibrium network when each player have different cost value for forming the link in the social network.