Modeling Representation of Minorities Under Multiwinner Voting Rules
Piotr Faliszewski, Jean-Francois Laslier, Robert Schaefer and, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

TL;DR
This paper investigates how different multiwinner voting rules impact minority representation and explores whether these rules can achieve proportional representation, through experimental and quantitative analysis.
Contribution
It provides a comparative analysis of multiwinner voting rules, highlighting their effects on minority representation and their potential to ensure proportionality.
Findings
Voting rules significantly influence minority representation
Some rules can achieve proportional representation
Experimental results demonstrate varying effectiveness of rules
Abstract
The goal of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we aim to experimentally and quantitatively show that the choice of a multiwinner voting rule can play a crucial role on the way minorities are represented. We also test the possibility for some of these rules to achieve proportional representation.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
