Coordination of Players in Ride-Sharing Games by Signaling

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic approach to improve vehicle sharing in ride-sharing services by using signaling and Bayes correlated equilibrium to coordinate user trips, reducing traffic congestion.

Contribution

It develops a ride-sharing game model incorporating externalities and demonstrates how signaling via Bayes correlated equilibrium enhances coordination and traffic efficiency.

Findings

Bayes correlated equilibrium improves ride-sharing coordination

Signaling reduces the price of anarchy in vehicle sharing

Enhanced vehicle utilization and traffic flow

Abstract

Sharing unused vehicles is one practical solution for traffic congestion. We propose an advanced vehicle-sharing service that maximizes the sharing of vehicles and improves traffic efficiency by coordinating user trips via an information system. We formulate ride-sharing games that model externalities in vehicle sharing caused by insufficient vehicle supply. We show how Bayes correlated equilibrium can coordinate players in ride-sharing games and verify the resultant improvement in the price of anarchy.