A proof of security for a key-policy RS-ABE scheme
Federico Giacon, Riccardo Aragona, Massimiliano Sala
TL;DR
This paper introduces a new key-policy revocable-storage attribute-based encryption scheme and provides a formal security proof under IND-CPA, enhancing data security with user revocation capabilities.
Contribution
It presents a novel key-policy RS-ABE scheme with a formal security proof, advancing attribute-based encryption with user revocation features.
Findings
Security is proven under IND-CPA assumptions.
The scheme supports user revocation effectively.
It extends attribute-based encryption with formal security guarantees.
Abstract
A revocable-storage attribute-based encryption (RS-ABE) scheme is an encryption scheme which extends attribute-based encryption by intro- ducing user revocation. A key-policy RS-ABE scheme links each key to an access structure. We propose a new key-policy RS-ABE scheme whose security we prove in term of indistinguishability under a chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA).
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