Reconciling Rationality and Stochasticity: Rich Behavioral Models in Two-Player Games
Mickael Randour

TL;DR
This paper explores advanced behavioral models in two-player games, bridging rational and stochastic paradigms to improve reactive system synthesis and decision-making in uncertain environments.
Contribution
It introduces formal frameworks that integrate rational and stochastic behaviors in two-player games, expanding the applicability of game theory in reactive systems and beyond.
Findings
Formal concepts for richer behavioral models
Frameworks for reasoning about mixed rational-stochastic behaviors
Application to journey planning in uncertain environments
Abstract
Two traditional paradigms are often used to describe the behavior of agents in multi-agent complex systems. In the first one, agents are considered to be fully rational and systems are seen as multi-player games. In the second one, agents are considered to be fully stochastic processes and the system itself is seen as a large stochastic process. From the standpoint of a particular agent - having to choose a strategy, the choice of the paradigm is crucial: the most adequate strategy depends on the assumptions made on the other agents. In this paper, we focus on two-player games and their application to the automated synthesis of reliable controllers for reactive systems - a field at the crossroads between computer science and mathematics. In this setting, the reactive system to control is a player, and its environment is its opponent, usually assumed to be fully antagonistic or fully…
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Taxonomy
TopicsFormal Methods in Verification · Simulation Techniques and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
