Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences

TL;DR

This paper introduces new strategyproof, efficient algorithms for house allocation problems with existing tenants and dichotomous preferences, achieving maximum agent satisfaction and stability in certain models.

Contribution

It provides the first polynomial-time, strategyproof algorithms for house allocation with existing tenants under dichotomous preferences, including a core-stable solution in the endowment-only model.

Findings

Algorithms are strategyproof and polynomial-time.

They maximize the number of satisfied agents.

One algorithm guarantees core stability in the endowment-only model.

Abstract

We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a core-stable allocation.