Prevention versus treatment: A game-theoretic approach

TL;DR

This paper develops a game-theoretic model combining individual decision-making and epidemic dynamics to analyze prevention and treatment strategies, showing prevention can eliminate epidemics if costs are low enough.

Contribution

It introduces a novel integrated model linking utility-based prevention choices with epidemic spread, providing insights into prevention coverage and epidemic control.

Findings

Prevention can prevent epidemics if its relative cost is sufficiently low.

The model predicts asymptotic prevention coverage levels.

Prevention alone can avert epidemics under certain cost conditions.

Abstract

Empirical studies show that preference for prevention versus treatment remains a subject of debate. We build a paradigm model combining a utility game for the individual-level dilemma of prevention versus treatment, and a compartmental model for the epidemic dynamic. We assume that individuals arrive to maximize the utility of voluntary prevention, as the epidemic reaches an endemic level alleviated by prevention and treatment. We thus obtain an expression for the asymptotic prevention coverage. Notably, we obtain that, if the relative cost of prevention versus treatment is sufficiently low, epidemics may be averted through the use of prevention alone.