Proof-theoretic strengths of weak theories for positive inductive definitions
Toshiyasu Arai

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the proof-theoretic strength of weak theories related to positive inductive definitions, showing how certain axioms and formulas influence the strength and boundaries of these theories.
Contribution
It calibrates the proof-theoretic ordinals of weak fragments of ID₁ and distinguishes between predicatively reducible and impredicative parts based on formula complexity.
Findings
The lightface Π₁¹-Comprehension axiom is proof-theoretically strong over RCA₀*.
Conjunctions of negative and positive formulas are weak in transfinite induction.
Disjunctions are strong, establishing a boundary between predicative and impredicative fragments.
Abstract
In this paper the lightface -Comprehension axiom is shown to be proof-theoretically strong even over , and we calibrate the proof-theoretic ordinals of weak fragments of the theory of positive inductive definitions over natural numbers. Conjunctions of negative and positive formulas in the transfinite induction axiom of are shown to be weak, and disjunctions are strong. Thus we draw a boundary line between predicatively reducible and impredicative fragments of .
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Taxonomy
TopicsComputability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Benford’s Law and Fraud Detection
