Interdependent Network Formation Games
Juntao Chen, Quanyan Zhu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic model for designing interdependent networks, enabling decentralized decision-making and convergence to optimal network topologies through iterative algorithms.
Contribution
It presents a novel two-player game framework for interdependent network formation, with algorithms that guarantee convergence to Nash equilibria and practical applicability.
Findings
Algorithms converge to Nash equilibrium in finite steps
Nash solutions are compared with team solutions for efficiency
Framework applicable to various network types like power and transportation
Abstract
Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global connectivity independently. This framework enables decentralized network design by using iterative algorithms. After a finite number of steps, the algorithm will converge to a Nash equilibrium, and yields the equilibrium topology of the network. We corroborate our results by using numerical experiments, and compare the Nash equilibrium solutions with their team solution counterparts. The experimental results of the game method and the team method provide design guidelines to increase the efficiency of the interdependent network formation games. Moreover, the proposed game framework can be generally applied to a diverse number of applications,…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Game Theory and Applications
