Interdependent Network Formation Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic model for designing interdependent networks, enabling decentralized decision-making and convergence to optimal network topologies through iterative algorithms.

Contribution

It presents a novel two-player game framework for interdependent network formation, with algorithms that guarantee convergence to Nash equilibria and practical applicability.

Findings

Algorithms converge to Nash equilibrium in finite steps

Nash solutions are compared with team solutions for efficiency

Framework applicable to various network types like power and transportation

Abstract

Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global connectivity independently. This framework enables decentralized network design by using iterative algorithms. After a finite number of steps, the algorithm will converge to a Nash equilibrium, and yields the equilibrium topology of the network. We corroborate our results by using numerical experiments, and compare the Nash equilibrium solutions with their team solution counterparts. The experimental results of the game method and the team method provide design guidelines to increase the efficiency of the interdependent network formation games. Moreover, the proposed game framework can be generally applied to a diverse number of applications, including power system networks and international air transportation networks.