The coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing in the resource competition game
Kun Li, Attila Szolnoki, Rui Cong, Long Wang

TL;DR
This paper uses evolutionary game theory to explore how overconfidence and bluffing coevolve in resource competition, revealing that bluffing often surpasses overconfidence and network structure influences their prevalence and punishment.
Contribution
It introduces a simple resource competition model demonstrating the coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing and analyzes the effects of social network topology on their dynamics.
Findings
Bluffing tends to evolve to higher levels than overconfidence.
Heterogeneous networks facilitate bluffing but also enhance punishment of overconfidence.
High real capability allows coexistence of bluffing and overconfidence.
Abstract
Resources are often limited, therefore it is essential how convincingly competitors present their claims for them. Beside a player's natural capacity, here overconfidence and bluffing may also play a decisive role and influence how to share a restricted reward. While bluff provides clear, but risky advantage, overconfidence, as a form of self-deception, could be harmful to its user. Still, it is a long-standing puzzle why these potentially damaging biases are maintained and evolving to a high level in the human society. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory, we present a simple version of resource competition game in which the coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing is fundamental, which is capable to explain their prevalence in structured populations. Interestingly, bluffing seems apt to evolve to higher level than corresponding overconfidence and in general the former is…
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