Modeling Human Ad Hoc Coordination
Peter M. Krafft, Chris L. Baker, Alex Pentland, Joshua B., Tenenbaum

TL;DR
This paper presents an exact algorithm for modeling the recursive beliefs necessary for rational coordination in uncertain environments and tests its application to human decision-making in coordination games.
Contribution
It introduces a novel algorithm for computing infinite belief hierarchies and applies it to model human coordination behavior in ad hoc multiagent settings.
Findings
The algorithm accurately models rational coordination in finite environments.
Modeling humans with this algorithm improves human-agent collaboration in simulations.
The approach provides insights into how humans form expectations for coordination.
Abstract
Whether in groups of humans or groups of computer agents, collaboration is most effective between individuals who have the ability to coordinate on a joint strategy for collective action. However, in general a rational actor will only intend to coordinate if that actor believes the other group members have the same intention. This circular dependence makes rational coordination difficult in uncertain environments if communication between actors is unreliable and no prior agreements have been made. An important normative question with regard to coordination in these ad hoc settings is therefore how one can come to believe that other actors will coordinate, and with regard to systems involving humans, an important empirical question is how humans arrive at these expectations. We introduce an exact algorithm for computing the infinitely recursive hierarchy of graded beliefs required for…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Game Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications
