Track selection in Multifunction Radars for Multi-target tracking: an Anti-Coordination game

TL;DR

This paper models track selection in multifunction radars for multi-target tracking as an anti-coordination game, proposing a distributed algorithm to find Nash equilibria and verifying its effectiveness through simulations.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for track selection in radar networks and develops a distributed algorithm for equilibrium computation.

Findings

The proposed algorithm converges to Nash equilibria in simulated scenarios.

Game-theoretic approach improves track selection efficiency.

Distributed method reduces computational complexity.

Abstract

In this paper, a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network is studied using the concepts from game theory. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, and specifically as an anti-coordination game, where each player aims to differ from what other players do. The players' utilities are modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and, under different assumptions on the structure of these utilities, the corresponding Nash equilibria are characterized. To find an equilibrium, a distributed algorithm based on the best-response dynamics is proposed. Finally, computer simulations are carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in a multi-target tracking scenario.