On the security of the Algebraic Eraser tag authentication protocol

TL;DR

This paper critically analyzes the Algebraic Eraser protocol, revealing practical attacks that undermine its claimed security level, highlighting the need for independent review of cryptographic schemes.

Contribution

It provides the first comprehensive set of practical attacks on the Algebraic Eraser protocol, demonstrating vulnerabilities and challenging its security claims.

Findings

Efficient tag impersonation demonstrated

Partial and total key recovery achieved

Contradicts claimed 80-bit security level

Abstract

The Algebraic Eraser has been gaining prominence as SecureRF, the company commercializing the algorithm, increases its marketing reach. The scheme is claimed to be well-suited to IoT applications but a lack of detail in available documentation has hampered peer-review. Recently more details of the system have emerged after a tag authentication protocol built using the Algebraic Eraser was proposed for standardization in ISO/IEC SC31 and SecureRF provided an open public description of the protocol. In this paper we describe a range of attacks on this protocol that include very efficient and practical tag impersonation as well as partial, and total, tag secret key recovery. Most of these results have been practically verified, they contrast with the 80-bit security that is claimed for the protocol, and they emphasize the importance of independent public review for any cryptographic proposal.