Executing Arbitrary Code in the Context of the Smartcard System Service
Michael Roland

TL;DR
This paper uncovers a critical security vulnerability in the Open Mobile API implementations on Android devices, allowing malicious apps to execute arbitrary code within the smartcard service and potentially escalate privileges.
Contribution
It identifies a severe weakness in the smartcard system service that enables arbitrary code execution via crafted APKs, highlighting a significant security flaw in Android's Open Mobile API.
Findings
Vulnerability allows arbitrary code execution in smartcard service
Exploitable on multiple Android devices and versions
Source code derived from SEEK-for-Android
Abstract
This report summarizes our findings regarding a severe weakness in implementations of the Open Mobile API deployed on several Android devices. The vulnerability allows arbitrary code coming from a specially crafted Android application package (APK) to be injected into and executed by the smartcard system service component (the middleware component of the Open Mobile API implementation). This can be exploited to gain elevated capabilities, such as privileges protected by signature- and system-level permissions assigned to this service. The affected source code seems to originate from the SEEK-for-Android open-source project and was adopted by various vendor-specific implementations of the Open Mobile API, including the one that is used on the Nexus 6 (as of Android version 5.1).
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Taxonomy
TopicsIPv6, Mobility, Handover, Networks, Security · Mobile Agent-Based Network Management · Service-Oriented Architecture and Web Services
