The Excess Returns of "Quality" Stocks: A Behavioral Anomaly
Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Stefano Ciliberti, Augustin Landier, Guillaume, Simon, David Thesmar

TL;DR
This paper examines the quality anomaly in equity markets, finding it is better explained by behavioral biases than risk, with analysts underestimating high quality firms' future returns.
Contribution
It provides novel evidence that the quality anomaly is driven by behavioral biases, challenging the risk-based explanations within efficient markets.
Findings
Returns on quality stocks are abnormally high on a risk-adjusted basis.
Analysts systematically underestimate future returns of high quality firms.
The quality anomaly is better explained by behavioral biases than risk.
Abstract
This note investigates the causes of the quality anomaly, which is one of the strongest and most scalable anomalies in equity markets. We explore two potential explanations. The "risk view", whereby investing in high quality firms is somehow riskier, so that the higher returns of a quality portfolio are a compensation for risk exposure. This view is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The other view is the "behavioral view", which states that some investors persistently underestimate the true value of high quality firms. We find no evidence in favor of the "risk view": The returns from investing in quality firms are abnormally high on a risk-adjusted basis, and are not prone to crashes. We provide novel evidence in favor of the "behavioral view": In their forecasts of future prices, and while being overall overoptimistic, analysts systematically underestimate the future…
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Taxonomy
TopicsFinancial Markets and Investment Strategies · Corporate Finance and Governance · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
