How Good is Bargained Routing?
Gideon Blocq, Ariel Orda

TL;DR
This paper explores the application of cooperative game theory, specifically Nash Bargaining, to routing in networks, showing potential for performance improvements and establishing new metrics like the Price of Selfishness and Price of Heterogeneity.
Contribution
It introduces the use of cooperative bargaining in network routing, analyzes performance bounds, and proposes new metrics to evaluate the benefits of cooperation over non-cooperative approaches.
Findings
Bargaining can improve system performance despite high PoA.
In symmetric cases, bargaining leads to social optimality.
PoH provides a bounded measure for heterogeneous agent scenarios.
Abstract
In the context of networking, research has focused on non-cooperative games, where the selfish agents cannot reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the infrastructure. Many approaches have been proposed for mitigating the typically inefficient operating points. However, in a growing number of networking scenarios selfish agents are able to communicate and reach an agreement. Hence, the degradation of performance should be considered at an operating point of a cooperative game. Accordingly, our goal is to lay foundations for the application of cooperative game theory to fundamental problems in networking. We explain our choice of the Nash Bargaining Scheme (NBS) as the solution concept, and introduce the Price of Selfishness (PoS), which considers the degradation of performance at the worst NBS. We focus on the fundamental load balancing game of routing over parallel…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
