Stable Marriage Problem with Ties and Incomplete bounded length preference list under social stability
Ashish Shrivastava, C. Pandu Rangan

TL;DR
This paper studies a variant of the socially stable marriage problem where preference lists are incomplete, contain ties, and have bounded length, focusing on finding maximum cardinality weakly socially stable matchings in large, realistic scenarios.
Contribution
It introduces a model for socially stable marriage with incomplete, tied, and bounded preference lists, and addresses the problem of maximizing the size of weakly socially stable matchings.
Findings
Analysis of the properties of weakly socially stable matchings.
Identification of conditions for maximum cardinality solutions.
Potential algorithms for finding large weakly socially stable matchings.
Abstract
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions arise very frequently where set of agents (man/woman) is very large and providing a complete and strict order preference list is practically in-feasible. In presence of ties in preference lists, the most common solution is weakly socially stable matching. It is a fact that in an instance, weakly stable matching can have different sizes. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly socially stable matching.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation
