Informational Braess' Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion
Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asuman Ozdaglar

TL;DR
This paper investigates how additional route information affects traffic congestion, revealing that in certain network classes, more information cannot worsen conditions, but in others, it can lead to increased delays, extending the classic Braess' Paradox.
Contribution
It introduces the concept of Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium and characterizes when additional information can harm traffic flow, providing network classification and algorithms for analysis.
Findings
IBP cannot occur in SLI networks
In non-SLI networks, IBP can occur with specific cost functions
Worst-case inefficiency of ICWE is no worse than standard Wardrop equilibrium
Abstract
To systematically study the implications of additional information about routes provided to certain users (e.g., via GPS-based route guidance systems), we introduce a new class of congestion games in which users have differing information sets about the available edges and can only use routes consisting of edges in their information set. After defining the notion of Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium (ICWE) for this class of congestion games and studying its basic properties, we turn to our main focus: whether additional information can be harmful (in the sense of generating greater equilibrium costs/delays). We formulate this question in the form of Informational Braes' Paradox (IBP), which extends the classic Braess' Paradox in traffic equilibria, and asks whether users receiving additional information can become worse off. We provide a comprehensive answer to this question…
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