Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks under DER Node Compromises

TL;DR

This paper develops a game-theoretic framework to assess and improve the security of electricity distribution networks against strategic compromises of DER nodes, providing insights into optimal defense and attack strategies.

Contribution

It introduces a tractable linear approximation for a complex trilevel optimization problem and proposes an iterative greedy method for strategy computation.

Findings

Identifies critical DER nodes for security reinforcement.

Provides optimal attack set-points and defense strategies.

Offers guidelines for security investment and response.

Abstract

This article focuses on the security assessment of electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) with vulnerable Distributed Energy Resource (DER) nodes. The adversary model is simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation of generation set-points. The loss to the defender (DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation and cost of induced load control under supply-demand mismatch caused by the attack. A 3-stage Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) game is formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a security strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes; in Stage 2, the attacker compromises a set of vulnerable DERs and injects false generation set-points; in Stage 3, the defender responds by controlling loads and uncompromised DERs. Solving this trilevel optimization problem is hard due to nonlinear power flows and mixed-integer decision variables. To address this challenge, the problem is approximated by a tractable formulation based on linear power flows. The set of critical DER nodes and the set-point manipulations characterizing the optimal attack strategy are computed. An iterative greedy approach to compute attacker-defender strategies for the original nonlinear problem is proposed. These results provide guidelines for optimal security investment and defender response in pre- and post-attack conditions, respectively.