Interdependent Relationships in Game Theory: A Generalized Model
Jiawei Li

TL;DR
This paper introduces a comprehensive game theory model that incorporates relationships and beliefs among players, unifying cooperative, non-cooperative, and intermediate game types, with applications to classic game scenarios.
Contribution
It presents a novel generalized model of games based on relationships and beliefs, extending traditional game theory to include a wider range of interactions.
Findings
The model unifies cooperative and non-cooperative games.
Analysis of prisoners' dilemma and ultimatum game demonstrates the model's applicability.
Relationships influence players' strategies beyond material payoffs.
Abstract
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships and supposed relationships between players. A relationship is a numerical value that denotes how one player cares for the payoffs of another player, while a supposed relationship is another numerical value that denotes a player's belief about the relationship between two players. The players choose their strategies by taking into consideration not only the material payoffs but also relationships and their change. Two games, a prisoners' dilemma and a repeated ultimatum game, are analyzed as examples of application of this model.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
