Energy Storage Sharing in Smart Grid: A Modified Auction Based Approach

TL;DR

This paper introduces a modified auction-based mechanism for sharing energy storage among residential units and shared facility controllers in a smart grid, optimizing capacity sharing and pricing through a Stackelberg game.

Contribution

It proposes a novel auction mechanism with incentive compatibility and individual rationality for joint energy storage sharing in smart grids.

Findings

The auction mechanism achieves efficient storage sharing.

The Stackelberg equilibrium ensures incentive compatibility.

Numerical results confirm scheme effectiveness.

Abstract

This paper studies the solution of joint energy storage (ES) ownership sharing between multiple shared facility controllers (SFCs) and those dwelling in a residential community. The main objective is to enable the residential units (RUs) to decide on the fraction of their ES capacity that they want to share with the SFCs of the community in order to assist them storing electricity, e.g., for fulfilling the demand of various shared facilities. To this end, a modified auction-based mechanism is designed that captures the interaction between the SFCs and the RUs so as to determine the auction price and the allocation of ES shared by the RUs that governs the proposed joint ES ownership. The fraction of the capacity of the storage that each RU decides to put into the market to share with the SFCs and the auction price are determined by a noncooperative Stackelberg game formulated between the RUs and the auctioneer. It is shown that the proposed auction possesses the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality properties, which are leveraged via the unique Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) solution of the game. Numerical experiments are provided to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.