Popularity Signals in Trial-Offer Markets with Social Influence and Position Bias
Felipe Maldonado, Pascal Van Hentenryck, Gerardo Berbeglia, Franco, Berbeglia

TL;DR
This paper analyzes how social influence and position bias affect trial-offer markets, showing that certain social signals lead to predictable, efficient markets with controlled inequalities, while others cause unpredictability and monopolies.
Contribution
It provides a theoretical framework demonstrating market convergence under specific social influence parameters and compares ranking strategies through simulations.
Findings
Market converges to a unique equilibrium for 0<r<1
Market becomes unpredictable when r>1
Quality ranking outperforms popularity ranking in efficiency
Abstract
This paper considers trial-offer markets where consumer preferences are modeled by a multinomial logit with social influence and position bias. The social signal for a product is given by its current market share raised to power r (or equivalently the number of purchases raised to the power of r). The paper shows that, when r is strictly between 0 and 1, and a static position assignment (e.g., a quality ranking) is used, the market converges to a unique equilibrium where the market shares depend only on product quality, not their initial appeals or the early dynamics. When r is greater than 1, the market becomes unpredictable. In many cases, the market goes to a monopoly for some product: Which product becomes a monopoly depends on the initial conditions of the market. These theoretical results are complemented by an agent-based simulation which indicates that convergence is fast when r…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
