SRPS: Secure Routing Protocol for Static Sensor Networks

TL;DR

SRPS is a lightweight, secure routing protocol for static sensor networks that ensures authentication, multiple disjoint paths, and resistance to various routing attacks, suitable for resource-constrained environments.

Contribution

The paper introduces SRPS, a novel secure routing protocol that combines symmetric cryptography with attack resistance tailored for resource-limited sensor networks.

Findings

SRPS effectively counters known routing attacks in simulations.

SRPS maintains low overhead suitable for sensor networks.

Security analysis confirms robustness against Byzantine attacks.

Abstract

In sensor networks, nodes cooperatively work to collect data and forward it to the final destination. Many protocols have been proposed in the literature to provide routing and secure routing for ad hoc and sensor networks, but these protocols either very expensive to be used in very resource-limited environments such as sensor networks, or suffer from the lack of one or more security guarantees and vulnerable to attacks such as wormhole, Sinkhole, Sybil, blackhole, selective forwarding, rushing, and fabricating attacks. In this paper we propose a secure lightweight routing protocol called SRPS. SRPS uses symmetric cryptographic entities within the capabilities of the sensors, supports intermediate node authentication of the routing information in addition to end-to-end authentication, provides secure multiple disjoint paths, and thwarts all the known attacks against routing infrastructure against Byzantine cooperative attack model. We analyze the security guarantees of SRPS and use Ns-2 simulations to show the effectiveness of SRPS in counter-measuring known attacks against the routing infrastructure. Overhead cost analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight-ness of SRPS