Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains

TL;DR

This paper develops non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for specific quasi-linear environments, demonstrating their uniqueness and limitations within certain domains, advancing the understanding of strategic manipulation prevention.

Contribution

It introduces a novel construction of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms applicable to restricted domains, establishing their optimality and domain limitations.

Findings

The proposed mechanisms are the only bribeproof solutions in certain natural problems.

No non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms exist beyond these restricted domains.

The results are tight, indicating the boundaries of possible bribeproof mechanisms.

Abstract

Schummer (Journal of Economic Theory 2000) introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome. This work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for these quasi-linear environments. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: For several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.