
TL;DR
This paper introduces a new model of collusions within organizations, analyzing how actors exchange goods and how their utilities evolve over time, revealing that collusions tend to be beneficial for members.
Contribution
The paper proposes a novel model of collusions with a detailed simulation of transactions and utility evolution, providing insights into the dynamics and profitability of collusive behavior.
Findings
Average evolution time scales as N^{2.9}
Individual utility functions tend to increase over time
System of collusions is generally profitable for members
Abstract
A new model of collusions in an organization is proposed. Each actor disposes one unique good . Each actor has also a list of other goods which he/she needs, in order from desired most to those desired less. Finally, each actor has also a list of other agents, initially ordered at random. The order in the last list means the order of the access of the actors to the good . A pair after a pair of agents tries to make a transaction. This transaction is possible if each of two actors can be shifted upwards in the list of actors possessed by the partner. Our numerical results indicate, that the average time of evolution scales with the number of actors approximately as . For each actor, we calculate the Kendall's rank correlation between the order of desired goods and actor's place at the lists of the good's possessors. We…
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