Modelling and Analysis of Network Security - an Algebraic Approach
Qian Zhang, Ying Jiang, Peng Wu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a unified algebraic framework based on probabilistic process calculus for modeling and analyzing various network security games, enabling efficient computation of Nash equilibria and optimal strategies.
Contribution
It proposes a novel algebraic approach using PVCCSG for uniformly modeling different security game scenarios and provides an algorithm for computing Nash equilibria strategies.
Findings
Effective in modeling diverse security scenarios
Algorithm successfully computes Nash equilibria
Demonstrated with four real-world case studies
Abstract
Game theory has been applied to investigate network security. But different security scenarios were often modeled via different types of games and analyzed in an ad-hoc manner. In this paper, we propose an algebraic approach for modeling and analyzing uniformly several types of network security games. This approach is based on a probabilistic extension of the value-passing Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) which is regarded as a Generative model for Probabilistic Value-passing CCS (PVCCSG for short). Our approach gives a uniform framework, called PVCCSG based security model, for the security scenarios modeled via perfect and complete or incomplete information games. We present then a uniform algorithm for computing the Nash equilibria strategies of a network security game on its PVCCSG based security model. The algorithm first generates a transition system for each of the PVCCSG…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Information and Cyber Security · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
