Computing all solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with discrete strategy sets
Simone Sagratella

TL;DR
This paper introduces a comprehensive branching algorithm and a fast Jacobi-type method for computing all solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with discrete strategy sets, filling a gap in existing solution techniques.
Contribution
It presents the first general branching algorithm for discrete strategy Nash problems, along with pruning, set-shrinking procedures, and a fast method for finding equilibria.
Findings
Algorithms perform well in practice
The branching method effectively computes the entire solution set
The Jacobi-type method quickly finds an equilibrium
Abstract
The Nash equilibrium problem is a widely used tool to model non-cooperative games. Many solution methods have been proposed in the literature to compute solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with continuous strategy sets, but, besides some specific methods for some particular applications, there are no general algorithms to compute solutions of Nash equilibrium problems in which the strategy set of each player is assumed to be discrete. We define a branching method to compute the whole solution set of Nash equilibrium problems with discrete strategy sets. This method is equipped with a procedure that, by fixing variables, effectively prunes the branches of the search tree. Furthermore, we propose a preliminary procedure that by shrinking the feasible set improves the performances of the branching method when tackling a particular class of problems. Moreover, we prove existence of…
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