The Ranking Problem of Alternatives as a Cooperative Game

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel ranking method for candidates based on cooperative game theory, specifically using the Shapley value, to determine the most suitable candidate from voter ballots.

Contribution

It proposes a new ranking procedure utilizing the Shapley value from cooperative game theory, linking voter preferences to a characteristic function for candidate evaluation.

Findings

The proposed method effectively ranks candidates based on voter profiles.

The ranking procedure's properties are thoroughly analyzed.

The approach offers a fair and mathematically grounded alternative to traditional voting methods.

Abstract

This paper considers the ranking problem of candidates for a certain position based on ballot papers filled by voters. We suggest a ranking procedure of alternatives using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary to construct a characteristic function via the filled ballot paper profile of voters. The Shapley value serves as the ranking method. The winner is the candidate having the maximum Shapley value. And finally, we explore the properties of the designed ranking procedure.