Falsification or Confirmation: From Logic to Psychology
Roman Lukyanenko

TL;DR
This paper reviews the philosophical debate between confirmation and falsification, proposing a new perspective grounded in cognitive psychology to better understand their differences.
Contribution
It introduces a novel approach by integrating cognitive psychology insights into the longstanding philosophical debate on falsification and confirmation.
Findings
Highlights limitations of purely logical arguments in the debate.
Suggests cognitive psychology offers valuable insights into scientific reasoning.
Proposes a new framework for understanding falsification and confirmation.
Abstract
Corroboration or confirmation is a prominent philosophical debate of the 20th century. Many philosophers have been involved in this debate most notably the proponents of confirmation led by Hempel and its most powerful criticism by the falsificationists led by Popper. In both cases however the debates were primarily based on the arguments from logic. In this paper we review these debates and suggest that a different perspective on falsification versus confirmation can be taken by grounding arguments in cognitive psychology.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophy and History of Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
