Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces
Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert

TL;DR
This paper extends zero-determinant strategies to iterated games with continuous and arbitrary action spaces, showing players can enforce payoff relationships even with limited actions, including extortionate strategies.
Contribution
It introduces a new class of autocratic strategies applicable to games with continuous action spaces, broadening the scope of strategic control beyond binary choices.
Findings
Players can enforce linear payoff relationships in continuous action spaces.
Autocratic strategies can be simple and effective even with infinite opponent options.
Players can implement extortionate strategies in generalized game settings.
Abstract
The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma sparked a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert unilateral control over iterated interactions. These remarkable strategies, however, are known to exist only in games in which players choose between two alternative actions such as "cooperate" and "defect." Here we introduce a broader class of autocratic strategies by extending zero-determinant strategies to iterated games with more general action spaces. We use the continuous Donation Game as an example, which represents an instance of the Prisoner's Dilemma that intuitively extends to a continuous range of cooperation levels. Surprisingly, despite the fact that the opponent has infinitely many donation levels from which to choose, a player can devise an autocratic strategy to enforce a linear relationship between his or her…
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