The Complexity of Equilibria for Risk-Modeling Valuations
Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien

TL;DR
This paper investigates the computational complexity of finding equilibria in risk-averse games where players evaluate costs using combined expectation and risk measures, proving NP-hardness in simple cases.
Contribution
It introduces the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property and demonstrates NP-hardness results for equilibrium existence in simple two-player or two-strategy games.
Findings
Deciding V-equilibrium existence is NP-hard for certain valuations.
Introduces E-strict concavity and Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
Proves complexity results for simple two-player or two-strategy games.
Abstract
We study the complexity of deciding the existence of mixed equilibria for minimization games where players use valuations other than expectation to evaluate their costs. We consider risk-averse players seeking to minimize the sum of expectation and a risk valuation of their costs; is non-negative and vanishes exactly when the cost incurred to a player is constant over all choices of strategies by the other players. In a -equilibrium, no player could unilaterally reduce her cost. Say that has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property if all strategies supported in a player's best-response mixed strategy incur the same conditional expectation of her cost. We introduce -strict concavity and observe that every -strictly concave valuation…
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