Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
Vadim Makarov, Jean-Philippe Bourgoin, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Mathieu, Gagn\'e, Thomas Jennewein, Sarah Kaiser, Raman Kashyap, Matthieu Legr\'e,, Carter Minshull, Shihan Sajeed

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that laser damage can create security vulnerabilities in practical quantum communication systems by inducing side channels, highlighting the need for rigorous testing to ensure security.
Contribution
It introduces a laser-damage attack method that can modify device behavior and create side channels in quantum communication systems, revealing a new security risk.
Findings
Laser damage can induce side channels in QC devices
Modified devices can be exploited for security breaches
Existing QC systems require testing for laser-induced vulnerabilities
Abstract
Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behaviour on-demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin-tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.
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