Project Maelstrom: Forensic Analysis of the BitTorrent-Powered Browser

TL;DR

This paper analyzes Project Maelstrom, a peer-to-peer browser that decentralizes web hosting, discussing its protocol, security, privacy, and censorship implications based on forensic analysis.

Contribution

It provides a detailed forensic analysis of the Maelstrom browser, highlighting its decentralized content sharing protocol and implications for web censorship and security.

Findings

Maelstrom enables resilient, censorship-resistant web hosting.

The protocol facilitates open content sharing among visitors.

Security and privacy challenges are inherent in the decentralized model.

Abstract

In April 2015, BitTorrent Inc. released their distributed peer-to-peer powered browser, Project Maelstrom, into public beta. The browser facilitates a new alternative website distribution paradigm to the traditional HTTP-based, client-server model. This decentralised web is powered by each of the visitors accessing each Maelstrom hosted website. Each user shares their copy of the website's source code and multimedia content with new visitors. As a result, a Maelstrom hosted website cannot be taken offline by law enforcement or any other parties. Due to this open distribution model, a number of interesting censorship, security and privacy considerations are raised. This paper explores the application, its protocol, sharing Maelstrom content and its new visitor powered "web-hosting" paradigm.