Robustness of round-robin differential-phase-shift quantum-key-distribution protocol against source flaws

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the robustness of the RRDPS quantum key distribution protocol against source flaws and side-channel attacks, showing it requires minimal assumptions and offers high security without detailed source characterization.

Contribution

It demonstrates that the RRDPS protocol remains secure under only three basic assumptions, even with source imperfections and side-channel attacks, highlighting its robustness.

Findings

Security holds with only three assumptions

No detailed source characterization needed

High robustness against source flaws

Abstract

Recently, a new type of quantum key distribution, called the round-robin differential phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol [Nature 509, 475 (2014)], was proposed, where the security can be guaranteed without monitoring any statistics. In this Letter, we investigate source imperfections and side-channel attacks on the source of this protocol. We show that only three assumptions are needed for the security, and no detailed characterizations of the source or the side-channel attacks are needed. This high robustness is another striking advantage of the RRDPS protocol over other protocols.