Negotiation Games
Philipp Hoffmann (Technische Universit\"at M\"unchen)
TL;DR
This paper introduces and analyzes negotiation games, a model of multi-party negotiations, studying coalition problems and their computational complexity, showing EXPTIME-completeness generally and PTIME solutions for specific cases.
Contribution
It initiates the study of negotiation games, analyzing coalition problems and establishing complexity results, including polynomial-time algorithms for certain subclasses.
Findings
General coalition problems are EXPTIME-complete.
Sound and deterministic negotiations allow polynomial-time solutions.
Negotiation models can be exponentially more compact than their state spaces.
Abstract
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for sound and deterministic or even weakly deterministic negotiations the problems can be solved in PTIME. Notice that the input of the problems is a negotiation, which can be exponentially more compact than its state space.
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