Quadratic Gaussian Privacy Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic model to analyze how privacy concerns influence strategic communication between agents, focusing on equilibria where messages convey information despite privacy protections.

Contribution

It develops a novel game-theoretic framework for privacy in strategic communication and characterizes equilibria where messages remain informative.

Findings

Constructed a family of nontrivial equilibria with informative messages

Analyzed properties of equilibria in privacy-preserving communication

Provided insights into the trade-offs between information sharing and privacy

Abstract

A game-theoretic model for analysing the effects of privacy on strategic communication between agents is devised. In the model, a sender wishes to provide an accurate measurement of the state to a receiver while also protecting its private information (which is correlated with the state) private from a malicious agent that may eavesdrop on its communications with the receiver. A family of nontrivial equilibria, in which the communicated messages carry information, is constructed and its properties are studied.