Computing stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games
Martin Gairing, Rahul Savani

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, providing both polynomial-time algorithms and PLS-completeness results for various stability concepts.
Contribution
It offers a nearly complete characterization of the tractability of computing stable outcomes in these games, including new algorithms and complexity results.
Findings
Polynomial-time algorithms for some stability concepts
PLS-completeness results for other stability concepts
Extension of negative results to broader classes of hedonic games
Abstract
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of such games that are guaranteed to possess stable outcomes. These games are specified by an undirected edge- weighted graph: nodes are players, an outcome of the game is a partition of the nodes into coalitions, and the utility of a node is the sum of incident edge weights in the same coalition. We consider several stability requirements defined in the literature. These are based on restricting feasible player deviations, for example, by giving existing coalition members veto power. We extend these restrictions by considering more general forms of preference aggregation for coalition members. In particular, we consider voting schemes to decide if…
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