Attack on a classical analogue of the Dunjko, Wallden, Kent and Andersson quantum digital signature protocol

TL;DR

This paper analyzes a classical analogue of a quantum digital signature protocol, revealing a man-in-the-middle vulnerability similar to known classical attacks, confirmed through automated theorem proving.

Contribution

It identifies a specific man-in-the-middle attack on a classical variant of a quantum digital signature protocol and demonstrates its effectiveness using formal modeling.

Findings

A classical analogue of the QDS protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.

Automated theorem proving confirms the attack's feasibility.

The attack suggests potential vulnerabilities in the quantum protocol itself.

Abstract

A quantum digital signature (QDS) protocol is investigated in respect of an attacker who can impersonate other communicating principals in the style of Lowe's attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. A man-in-the-middle attack is identified in respect of a classical variant of the protocol and it is suggested that a similar attack would be effective against the QDS protocol. The attack has been confirmed through initial protocol modelling using a automated theorem prover, ProVerif.